

came together as a body. We are giving tools to the administration to hopefully change the behavior of this regime. I am proud of our colleagues who negotiated this deal with the House. I am hopeful it will help.

I will conclude with one final thought: Whatever tools it takes to change the behavior of the Iranian Government we need to keep on the table, and the best tool is a peaceful tool. But if military force is ever required to change Iranian behavior, I hope that will be at least considered as the last option, not the first option. I hope we never go down that road. But it may be a road you have to explore if all this fails.

I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. RISCH. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the quorum calls be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RISCH. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KYL. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURRIS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to speak on the Iran sanctions conference report which I assume we will be approving in a matter of a few minutes. This is a very important event in the Congress and could play a very significant role in the history of our country. I support the conference report. It is designated as H.R. 2194. I reiterate, I believe it is crucial that the Senate approve the conference report and that the President sign it into law as soon as possible. I fully predict both of those things will occur.

Let me mention three of the most important provisions of the bill so we know what it does. It deals with sanctions against Iran. There are two reasons: No. 1, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability, and No. 2, to support the aspirations of the people of Iran for a more representative government.

What the bill does first is to expand the scope of existing sanctions against companies that invest in Iran's energy sector, and it includes measures to punish firms that export gasoline to Iran. We would think a country such as Iran would have plenty of gasoline, but they do not have refinery capacity to

create the finished product which their people must use. So something on the order of at least 40 percent of their gasoline has to be imported. Because of this heavy dependence on imported gasoline, it is vulnerable to outside pressure, and that is why this particular sanction is an important step. By putting a squeeze on Iran's gas supplies and dissuading energy firms from investing in the country, we can hopefully force the Iranian regime to make difficult decisions about its finances, thereby further increasing its unpopularity.

Second, the bill limits nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and countries which sell illicit materials to Iran. It also limits licenses under any such current agreements. A country that allows its citizens or companies to provide equipment or technologies or materials to Iran that make a material contribution to its nuclear capabilities should not benefit from nuclear cooperation with the United States, and we make it clear that won't be permitted under this provision.

The third thing the bill does is it includes the so-called McCain language that requires the President to compile a list of Iranian officials, specific people who have brutalized the Iranian people, and to impose sanctions against those particular individuals identified as human rights violators. The administration can use the new authority it is given in this legislation to publicly identify those people in the Iranian Government who are actually responsible for perpetrating human rights violations in Iran since the fraudulent elections in June of 2009. It can hold these people accountable through these targeted sanctions. The measure also requires that such persons be subject to restrictions on financial and property transactions. It also makes such persons ineligible for U.S. visas.

We can see there is a broad array of targeted kinds of sanctions that, combined, could have a significant impact on our policy with Iran.

While I am pleased that the conferees concluded their work and the legislation is here on the floor, I do wish to note in passing that it is long overdue. At the request of the administration, Congress has repeatedly delayed action on bilateral sanctions legislation. Because sanctions take time to work, we have given up some time here.

In some respects, we have wasted too much time waiting for the United Nations to finally act, as it eventually did earlier this month. The U.N. Security Council resolution, however, will do very little to slow down or stop Iran's nuclear weapons program or even prevent its support for terrorism around the world. Its provisions—the bulk of them—are voluntary. They don't deal with Iran's energy sector. This is primarily because of the demand of the Chinese Government. It also excludes Russia's cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr powerplant as well as the sale

by Russia of the S-300 missile system to Iran, a very modern and effective anti-aircraft system which could certainly play a role in defending Iran against an attack on its nuclear facilities.

In addition, the divided vote of the Security Council displays to Iran that the world is not united in dealing with its illicit conduct. In fact, I argue that, in a way, we are in a worse position than we were 18 months ago when the President started his diplomacy in dealing with Iran. Up to then, all of the resolutions that had been passed against Iran had been unanimous. This one was not unanimous. In some respects, we have lost ground.

It is clear that the President's effort to get the Iranian regime to negotiate for that 18-month period did not achieve anything except allow the Iranians more time to develop their weaponry. The U.S. sanctions resolution is not going to be very effective in going any further than that, in my view, nor will the European Union add much to the U.N. resolution, although they will add something.

Before I conclude, let me ponder for a second a question others have asked, which is, How important is it that we do everything we can to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? What would happen if it did acquire a nuclear weapon? What would be the big deal?

Imagine a world in which Iran does have a nuclear weapon. Lay aside the fact that we have a picture of the Iranian leader, Ahmadinejad, with a nuclear weapon and just imagine what he would do with that. Would it really be possible to contain a nuclear Iran using conventional deterrence mechanisms?

Some would say: We lived with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union for four decades. It worked with Moscow; why would it not work with Tehran? To some extent, it depends on the definition of "work." Will it work?

Remember that while the Soviets never actually used their nuclear weapons, the fact that they possessed the weapons made a big difference in political events over those 40 years. It allowed them to subjugate Eastern Europe, and we had no way of responding. Had we tried to respond, there was the nuclear threat against us. It allowed them to foment a Communist revolution around the world and to sponsor a range of international terrorist groups during this period of time. When the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 in order to crush a democratic uprising, they knew the risk of a nuclear exchange would prevent the United States from responding with military force. I remember at that time the disappointment of the Hungarians who thought the United States had led them to think we would be supportive. In effect, there was nothing we could do that wouldn't potentially provoke a nuclear attack by Russia, and nobody wanted that. In other words, Moscow's nuclear arsenal served as the ultimate deterrent. It allowed the Kremlin to